Abstract-Publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) allows not only shareholders themselves but also everyone verify the shares of a secret distributed by a dealer. It has a lot of electronic applications. In this paper, we propose a publicly verifiable member-join protocol for threshold signatures. In our proposal, a new member can join a PVSS scheme to share the secret only with the help of old shareholders. What's more, everyone besides the new member can verify the validity of the new member's share, while only the new member knows his share. Different from previous protocols, our protocol can tolerate a mobile adversary. This proposal adapts to many electronic applications. Finally, we analyze the security of our scheme.
INTRODUCTION
A secret sharing scheme (SS) can make a secret be divided into many shares that are shared among a set of shareholders. The secret construction needs the cooperation of some qualified subset. The secret sharing scheme is composed of two phases. The first is distribution phase, in which a dealer distributes secret shares into many shareholders or shareholders jointly generate their shares by a distributed protocol. The second phase is reconstruction phase, in which some qualified subset of the shareholders reconstructs the secret by their shares. The secret sharing scheme was firstly introduced by Blakley [1] and Shamir [2] in 1979, independently. It has wide applications in distributed computations. However, the secret sharing scheme assumes that the dealer and all the shareholders are honest. If the dealer distributes false shares in distribution phase or dishonest shareholders provide false shares in reconstruction phase, the secret can't be computed correctly. The verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [3~5] aims at resolving this problem. It can verify the validity of the shares in distribution and reconstruction phases. It plays an important role in design of protocols of distributed key generation [6, 7] and secure multi-party computation [8~11] . Publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) [12~17] is a special VSS in which not only the shareholders but also everyone can verify whether the shares are valid or not.
Secret sharing scheme, however, can only be applied to the condition that the group of shareholders is static. If the group of shareholders is dynamic, computation of the new shares is necessary. The schemes [18] and [19] can enroll and disenroll shareholders from the access structure, respectively. Martin et al. [20] introduced some bounds and techniques for efficient secret redistribution schemes. A secret redistribution protocol was proposed by Desmedt and Jajodia [21] , which can distribute the new shares from a group of old shareholders to another disjoint groups of new shareholders. Wong et al. [22] gave a protocol with verifiable ability through improving protocol [21] . In these schemes, when a new member joins a secret sharing scheme, all old shareholders have to change their shares. Refs. [23, 24] proposed two protocols which can verifiably distribute a share to a new member. And old shareholders don't change their shares after distribution, which can bring great convenience to key management.
However, faced with a mobile adversary, how to publicly verifiably join a new member in a secret sharing scheme is an interesting problem. One ideal method is to set up a trusted party (dealer) always available. We can let the trusted party hold the secret and distribute a new share to the new member. Unfortunately, the trusted party is easy to become a target to be attacked by an adversary in electronic society, so it is impossible for the trusted party to be online always. We wish the share for the new member can be computed with the help of a group of old shareholders. Thus it is very important to design a publicly verifiable secret sharing member-join protocol for electronic applications. Ref. [25] proposed a publicly verifiable secret redistribution protocol, however, in this protocol all old shares needs change if a new member join the system similarly to [22] . It will bring the burden of key management. Refs. [17, 26] proposed two protocols that can publicly verifiably join a new member without changing old shares in a PVSS scheme. However, they can only tolerate a static adversary. If the adversary can corrupt different players in different time points, the protocols can't get the correct result. The motivation of this paper is to put forward a protocol for threshold signatures to resolve the problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries of our work including the definitions of secret sharing scheme, publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and publicly verifiable secret sharing member-join protocol, notations and building blocks. A concrete description of our proposal is given in Section 3. In addition, we give the security theorems in section 4 and give the method of how to decide the value of m in section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Definitions
We say access structure Γ is monotone if it follows that if A ∈ Γ and A B ⊆ then B ∈ Γ . The first is the secret distribution phase. In this phase, the dealer runs this algorithm 1 2 ( ) { , ,..., } n Share s s s s = to compute and publicly verifiably distribute shares to participants 1 ,..., n P P . The secret s is shared by a (t,n) secret sharing scheme.
The second is the member-join phase. In this phase, a new member firstly selects a group of shareholders A ∈ Γ to help him generate new share. All shareholders i P A ∈ blind shares i s using functions ( )
Blind s s ′ = .
And then publicly verifiably send the blinded shares i s ′ to the new member. The validity of the blinded shares can be verified by everyone. The new member selects a group B of t shareholders who provide correct blinded shares. Using a construct algorithm, the new member computes his share
Construct s i B s + ′ ∈ = according to these blinded shares i s ′ . Finally, the secret is shared by a (t,n+1) secret sharing scheme.
B. Notations
p and q are primes s.t. | 1 q p − . Let G denote a group with prime order p and g be a generator of group G. Let * p h Z ∈ be an element of order q. The secret s is shared by a ( , ) t n publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme among n participants 1 2 , ,..., n P P P . The new member to join the system is 1 n P + .
C. Building Blocks ⑴ Verifiable Secret sharing scheme
The shared secret k is in p Z . Randomly choose a polynomial
where
Compute the secret shares
for each member i P P ∈ . At the same time, the dealer broadcasts commits
Member i P use Eq. According to some subset B (|B|=t), any shares for j P B ∉ can be computed by the following Eq.
(2) Verifiable Encryption of Discrete Logarithms ( , , , )
Where D is a sender, i P is a receiver, and i s is a secret that is encrypted by the sender D and verifiably sent to the receiver i P . i E is a commit of i s satisfying
In this protocol, receiver i P selects i R p x Z ∈ as her secret key, and then publishes her public key
The sender D distributes an encrypted secret i s to i P while everyone can verify the validity of the encrypted i s . 
and verifies the following equation
holds or not. If it holds, i P believes her share is correct.
Otherwise, publishes i s and broadcasts a complaint against the dealer.
(4) Everyone j P can check the validity of each share
, ,
And by verifying whether equation (11) Z .
Theorem 2
The described non-interactive protocol above is perfectly zero-knowledge.
The above protocol and theorems are taken from [13] with slight modification.
III. THE PROPOSED PVSSMJ PROTOCOL
The protocol is composed of two phases. The first phase is secret distribution phase. In this phase, a dealer publicly verifiably distributes the shares of a secret into a group of shareholders 1 2 , ,..., n P P P . This procedure is similar to Stadler's PVSS [13] . The second phase is member-join phase that is the core phase of our protocol. In this phase, a group of old shareholders that are selected by the new member help the new member publicly verifiably generate a share. The both phases are described as follows: 
, , , ,
And then verifies whether equation (21) (2) And then each member ( 1, 2,..., ) (4) Each ( 1, 2,..., ) 
Proof .
It is because:
( 1) (
( 1)( )
( 1) ( 1)
The dishonest participants can be discovered in the proposed protocol. And when 2 1 n t ≥ − , even if an adversary can corrupt t-1 old shareholders at one timeperiod, the new member still can get the right share.
In secret distribution phase, the participating shareholders can verify whether the shares distributed by the dealer are right or not by verifying equation (23) in step (4) and equation (21) in step (5) .
In member-join phase, a dishonest participating shareholder can deceive other members as follows:
Case 1: She can give other shareholders false value (values) in step (1) (42) in step (9) . Therefore, the dishonest participating shareholders can be discovered in the proposed protocol. When 2 1 n t ≥ − , if fewer than t members give the correct j s ′ , the value of m will be increased up to 2t-1. At that time, even if an adversary can corrupt t-1 old shareholders, there are still no fewer than t honest shareholders. So these participants can help the new member get right share. 
Proof.
We define the polynomial in another format:
Thus the coefficient of Above theorem and proof is taken from [27] .
Theorem 5
The proposed protocol satisfies that: (1) If an adversary corrupts t-1 members, she can't get any useful information about the secret and other members' shares in the protocol. V. HOW TO DECIDE THE VALUE OF M m is a variable value between t and 2t-1. If m is chosen as t, then the protocol has to restart from step (1) when a participant is corrupted, however, it needs very few communication data and interactions when all participants are honest. If m is chosen as 2t-1, the protocol will never restart even if t-1 participants are corrupted, however, it needs many communication data and interactions when all participants are honest. Therefore, the value of m is decided by actual circumstance. If participants are not easy to be corrupted, m should be chosen as a smaller value. Otherwise, m should be chosen as a lager value.
How much should m be increased when the protocol needs to be restarted in step (8) ? Similarly to what we have discussed above, if participants are not easy to be corrupted, m should be increased slightly. Otherwise, m should be increased greatly. A proposed method in common circumstance is as follows: Firstly, let the value of m equate t; if the protocol needs to be restarted in step (8), we then increase m up to 2t-1 directly. Therefore the protocol assures to be finished by twice execution at most. From above mentioned, the choice of m is very important for the efficiency of the protocol.
When m is chosen as 2t-1, the proposed scheme can tolerate a mobile adversary as long as the periodical operation of refreshing shares is added to the scheme. It is because more than t-1 members being honest in each period can recover the secret and the dishonest members will be rebooted to remove the control of the mobile adversary. It is impossible for scheme [26] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a publicly verifiable secret sharing member-join protocol for threshold signatures. This protocol solves the problem of how to dynamically publicly verifiably join members without changing old shares even if it is faced to mobile adversary. It is especially useful in many electronic applications including key-escrow systems, electronic voting, anonymity-revocation in e-cash systems and so on. It also is applied to threshold signatures to make schemes more flexibly.
